Postponing the Legal Retirement Age

This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, firstly, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system, and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. Our results suggest that an increase in the redistributive character of the system could lead to a larger social consensus to postpone the legal retirement age. Surprisingly, it could be the case that the richest people would support more redistribution if that implies to postpone the pensionable age.Legal retirement age, pension benefits, redistribution level

ELECTION ON RETIREMENT AGE

We analyze the relationship between wage distribution, degree of redistribution of the Social Security and effective retirement age. We develop a two-staged political economy model. In the first stage government chooses the redistribution level of the Social Security Program, according to three different criteria. In second stage the retirement age is elected through a majority voting process by agents with different wages, knowing exactly the redistribution level and voting accordingly. We analyze the different elected retirement age under each government criterium.Wage distribution; retirement age; level of redistribution; median voter

Immigration and Pension Benefits in the Host-country

This paper examines the role that low-skilled immigrant labor force plays in determining the benefits of the public pension of the host population. With an overlapping-generations model in continuous time which allows to identify which groups of native population are better or worse off with immigration and a fully redistributive pension system, we find that the retirement benefits and hence the welfare levels of the host population are affected in a different way whether sharing or not pension benefits with immigrants. In this sense, the youngest local population may prefer, contrary to the oldest ones, a policy of closed borders.Immigration, welfare, pension benefits.

Defined Contribution vs Defined Pension: Reforming the Legal Retirement Age

In this paper we analyze the effects of changing Social Security parameters on the optimal legal retirement age. Two Social Security Systems are studied, with opposite results. When the pension scheme has a defined contribution, a more redistributive system will delay the preferred legal retirement age. On the other hand, when the pension benefit is the defined parameter, the increase in the redistribution level will lower this preferred age.

Population Aging and Legal Retirement Age.

This paper analyzes the effects of population aging on the preferred legal retirement age. What is revealed is the crucial role that the indirect ’macro’ effects resulting from a change in the legal retirement age play in the optimal decision. Two Social Security systems are studied. Under a defined contribution scheme aging lowers the preferred legal retirement age. However, under a defined pension scheme the retirement age is delayed. This result shows the relevance of correctly choosing the parameter affected by the dependency ratio in the design of the Social Security programme.Social security, aging, legal retirement age

Evaluation of a Fall Alerting System based on a Convolutional Deep Neural Network

Artículo sobre detección de caídas con redes neuronales profundasOwing to the effects of falls on quality of life of the elderly, automatic fall detection systems (FDS) have become a key research topic in the ambit of telecare. This works assesses the performance of convolutional neural networks when they are applied to identify fall accidents in a wearable FDS provided with a tri-axial accelerometer. The evaluation of the detection algorithm is carried out by employing a benchmarking repository with a wide set of traces captured from a wide group of volunteers that executed a programmed series of Activities of the Daily Living (ADLs) and emulated falls. Results show that the CNN can properly distinguish both types of movements with a success rate (specificity and sensitivity) around 99%.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

The power of delegation: Allowing workers to choose their wage

This paper analyzes the effect of delegation on the employees’ performance in an experimental gift exchange game where employers may allow workers to choose their own wage. Our results show that workers reciprocate positively towards companies that delegate the decision of the wage, obtaining that higher effort levels are displayed when workers are free to choose their wage, even when wages chosen by employees are similar to those assigned by employers. In addition, we find that this enhancement in workers’ behavior is mainly due to the positive effect of delegation per se rather than to the “responsibility-alleviation”.labor market, gift exchange-game, delegation, responsibility-allevietion, experiments.